I've gotten comments and been in discussions with people who seem to think that my "Blonde Jihadist" post argues that profiling is effective. I'd like to clarify that what I'm arguing is that the case of LaRose does not establish that it is ineffective (or that it is effective) to profile. It says nothing useful about the debate at all, in fact, contra Rachell Maddow's claim that LaRose shows that profiling is "stupid". It does not, and Maddow should know better.
That said, profiling might still be stupid. In fact, there's good reason to believe that ethnic profiling, by itself, is stupid. See for instance this 2002 article from CNN's Fareed Zakaria for more discussion.
Friday, March 12, 2010
Thursday, March 11, 2010
The Blonde Jihadist
The indictment of Colleen LaRose, a 46 year old white woman who was charged with providing material support to terrorists has raised, once again, some interesting questions about racial or ethnic profiling. LaRose, aka "Jihad Jane", converted to Islam "several years ago" according to law enforcement officials and was involved in trying to recruit jihadists to kill Lars Vilks, a cartoonist whose "depictions of the Prophet Muhammad incited protests by Muslims".
Rachel Maddow at MSNBC has pointed to the case of LaRose as a clear example of why racial profiling for law enforcement purposes is pointless and "stupid". Maddow's point, presumably, is that profiling doesn't work, because when a 46 year old white woman with blonde hair can end up "Jihad Jane", it's clear that not just young men of Arab descent are engaged in terrorist planning and activities. Maddow, in other words, makes what I'll call the Effectiveness Claim: profiling doesn't work because people outside the profile engage in criminal or terrorist activities. This makes the profiling strategy bad, because when looking for people who fit the profile, actual criminals or terrorists could slip right by. Fair enough.
Whatever the merits of the Effectiveness Claim, however, it's doubtful that Jihad Jane provides much confirmation of it. For one, LaRose is an outlier, an abnormality, which is why she ended up on the Rachel Maddow in the first place (if "she" had been a "he", from Saudi Arabia, say goodbye to MSNBC coverage). Outliers do not disprove statistical norms. Not every person who is a terrorist will fit the profile, as even profilers agree. The rationale behind profiling is that most of the people who engage in some behavior will fit a profile, or even that many will. The point is that the distribution of factors like ethnicity, age, and gender in the population of terrorists are not simply random. So, given the Effectiveness Claim, the LaRose case says nothing, since we would expect outliers in any realistic sample of terrorists.
Second, the LaRose case is troubling for the Effectiveness Claim because, recall, LaRose is a self-admitted Muslim. In this sense, then, she fits a profile of jihadist terrorist types rather than helps disconfirm one. She is, in other words, another example of a Muslim engaging in jihadist terrorist planning or activities. This of course doesn't show that all Muslims are terrorists (certainly not true), or even that most or many Muslims are terrorists. But it does show that one more Muslim is a terrorist, and it does not show that non-Muslims are terrorists, too.
So, the LaRose case does little, actually, for proponents of the Effectiveness Claim, like (apparently) Maddow. What Maddow and others who oppose profiling might want to argue instead is something I'll call the Moral Claim, which says that because not all terrorists are members of a particular religion or ethnicity or gender, even if many are, it is morally unacceptable to profile people based on those factors. It's much harder to argue with the Moral Claim, particularly when one recognizes the frustration and humiliation that wrongly targeted people must feel when they find themselves victims of profiling.
Read story here.
Rachel Maddow at MSNBC has pointed to the case of LaRose as a clear example of why racial profiling for law enforcement purposes is pointless and "stupid". Maddow's point, presumably, is that profiling doesn't work, because when a 46 year old white woman with blonde hair can end up "Jihad Jane", it's clear that not just young men of Arab descent are engaged in terrorist planning and activities. Maddow, in other words, makes what I'll call the Effectiveness Claim: profiling doesn't work because people outside the profile engage in criminal or terrorist activities. This makes the profiling strategy bad, because when looking for people who fit the profile, actual criminals or terrorists could slip right by. Fair enough.
Whatever the merits of the Effectiveness Claim, however, it's doubtful that Jihad Jane provides much confirmation of it. For one, LaRose is an outlier, an abnormality, which is why she ended up on the Rachel Maddow in the first place (if "she" had been a "he", from Saudi Arabia, say goodbye to MSNBC coverage). Outliers do not disprove statistical norms. Not every person who is a terrorist will fit the profile, as even profilers agree. The rationale behind profiling is that most of the people who engage in some behavior will fit a profile, or even that many will. The point is that the distribution of factors like ethnicity, age, and gender in the population of terrorists are not simply random. So, given the Effectiveness Claim, the LaRose case says nothing, since we would expect outliers in any realistic sample of terrorists.
Second, the LaRose case is troubling for the Effectiveness Claim because, recall, LaRose is a self-admitted Muslim. In this sense, then, she fits a profile of jihadist terrorist types rather than helps disconfirm one. She is, in other words, another example of a Muslim engaging in jihadist terrorist planning or activities. This of course doesn't show that all Muslims are terrorists (certainly not true), or even that most or many Muslims are terrorists. But it does show that one more Muslim is a terrorist, and it does not show that non-Muslims are terrorists, too.
So, the LaRose case does little, actually, for proponents of the Effectiveness Claim, like (apparently) Maddow. What Maddow and others who oppose profiling might want to argue instead is something I'll call the Moral Claim, which says that because not all terrorists are members of a particular religion or ethnicity or gender, even if many are, it is morally unacceptable to profile people based on those factors. It's much harder to argue with the Moral Claim, particularly when one recognizes the frustration and humiliation that wrongly targeted people must feel when they find themselves victims of profiling.
Read story here.
Wednesday, March 10, 2010
What Obama Inherited
Pollster Scott Rasmussen writing in the WSJ breaks down the problem with ObamaCare, as only a pollster can: 15 consecutive Rasmussen Reports polls over the last four months show that 52-58% of Americans continue to oppose the plan, while only 38-44% are in favor.
Deflating results for Mr. Obama, particularly in light of "repeated and intense sales efforts" by him and by his supporters on the Hill.
But why the negative numbers? Mr. Rasmussen points out that pitching the plan as deficit neutral garners little traction among Americans, who think spending cuts are more important today than deficit reduction. However, the "bigger problem" is that Americans no longer trust official projections, from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) or anywhere else in government. 81% of voters say "it's likely the plan will end up costing more than projected." Only 10% report that the official numbers from CBO are "on target."
So, people are either becoming wise to the farce of "expert" financial predictions, or they've become sceptical that politicians who invoke such experts for political purposes are giving them the straight scoop(or the brow-crinkling is shared to some proportion between the two). Either way, it bodes poorly for ObamaCare, and for new program creation tied to spending generally.
This point is worth fleshing out more. Opposition to the health care plan is frequently explained in terms of right of center Americans who are distrustful of big government and "socialized" medicine. But this analysis does not account for the lackluster support from independent voters, who have not aligned with any party, and who presumably try to vote "on the issues" rather than on Republican talking points about the dangers of socialism, and so on. These independents comprise a new kind of voter who, like Republicans and Democrats, tend more and more to be distrustful of the effectiveness of government generally, apparently including the CBO.
It would strain credulity to claim that Mr. Obama, in the span of a few short months in his first term (and in diametric opposition to his "yes we can" campaign message), managed such a wholesale change in our perception of government. This phenomenon must have, in other words, started long before Mr. Obama took office. It's fair to speculate whether, in fact, it has its roots in the projections and prognostications of prior administrations, notably the Iraq War WMD fiasco in the Bush years, and other glib notions about Republican administrations and fiscal responsibility.
At any rate, the "lies they tell us" brand of cynicism about government is clearly a factor in Mr. Obama's health care woes, and suggests that selling other Big Ideas to a weary American public in the face of historic deficits and unemployment will be an uphill battle. Perhaps 9-11 "changed everything", as has been said. One of the things it's appeared to change, at least for our current political age, is the notion that what government says and does is true and good.
Deflating results for Mr. Obama, particularly in light of "repeated and intense sales efforts" by him and by his supporters on the Hill.
But why the negative numbers? Mr. Rasmussen points out that pitching the plan as deficit neutral garners little traction among Americans, who think spending cuts are more important today than deficit reduction. However, the "bigger problem" is that Americans no longer trust official projections, from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) or anywhere else in government. 81% of voters say "it's likely the plan will end up costing more than projected." Only 10% report that the official numbers from CBO are "on target."
So, people are either becoming wise to the farce of "expert" financial predictions, or they've become sceptical that politicians who invoke such experts for political purposes are giving them the straight scoop(or the brow-crinkling is shared to some proportion between the two). Either way, it bodes poorly for ObamaCare, and for new program creation tied to spending generally.
This point is worth fleshing out more. Opposition to the health care plan is frequently explained in terms of right of center Americans who are distrustful of big government and "socialized" medicine. But this analysis does not account for the lackluster support from independent voters, who have not aligned with any party, and who presumably try to vote "on the issues" rather than on Republican talking points about the dangers of socialism, and so on. These independents comprise a new kind of voter who, like Republicans and Democrats, tend more and more to be distrustful of the effectiveness of government generally, apparently including the CBO.
It would strain credulity to claim that Mr. Obama, in the span of a few short months in his first term (and in diametric opposition to his "yes we can" campaign message), managed such a wholesale change in our perception of government. This phenomenon must have, in other words, started long before Mr. Obama took office. It's fair to speculate whether, in fact, it has its roots in the projections and prognostications of prior administrations, notably the Iraq War WMD fiasco in the Bush years, and other glib notions about Republican administrations and fiscal responsibility.
At any rate, the "lies they tell us" brand of cynicism about government is clearly a factor in Mr. Obama's health care woes, and suggests that selling other Big Ideas to a weary American public in the face of historic deficits and unemployment will be an uphill battle. Perhaps 9-11 "changed everything", as has been said. One of the things it's appeared to change, at least for our current political age, is the notion that what government says and does is true and good.
Monday, March 8, 2010
That Bedfellows Thing
David Brooks of NYT compares the Tea Partiers to the 1960s anti-establishment "New Left". His argument is that the most salient aspect of the Tea Party movement is its relation to institutional power, to The Man, and in this sense it resembles the New Left. Common to both movements, he writes, is the assumption that the common folk are the good guys and that our leaders and institutions are corrupt. The solution? Start over, tear it down, get the power back to the people.
Brooks' analysis is certainly not anything approaching comprehensive, but it seems right to me as far as it goes.
Brooks' analysis is certainly not anything approaching comprehensive, but it seems right to me as far as it goes.
Thursday, March 4, 2010
City of Angels
Timothy Egan writes in the NYT about the perplexing reduction in crime in L.A., with homicides down 80%. Apparently Omaha, Nebraska has a higher murder rate (I guess this is noteworthy because places like Omaha or Nebraska in general are supposed to be full of rock solid heartland types driving pickup trucks, giving strangers stranded on the Interstate a lift to the local diner).
Egan is a bit short on explanation -- he cites several, none of which seem much more than anecdotes -- but the general idea, it seems, is that the drug wars are cooling down, and people like the police, and they do a pretty good job. Well, okay.
Egan is a bit short on explanation -- he cites several, none of which seem much more than anecdotes -- but the general idea, it seems, is that the drug wars are cooling down, and people like the police, and they do a pretty good job. Well, okay.
Wednesday, March 3, 2010
Due Process in McDonald
Expectations are that the Supreme Court will find in favor of plaintiff in McDonald v. Chicago, which will effectively apply the Heller decision-- that the individual has a right to bear arms in relation to the Federal government-- to the states. In this case, the individual has this right in relation to his or her state. Proponents of gun rights rightly point out that this effectively makes gun bans unconstitutional (it does not prohibit, of course, reasonable restrictions on the sale and use of guns, including certain types of guns, like so-called "assault weapons").
The Court will likely argue its case using the due process clause of the 14th Amendment, the clause responsible for transporting much of the Bill of Rights to the states (also, famously, the non-enumerated "right to privacy", which played a pivotal rule in the landmark 1973 Roe v. Wade abortion ruling.)
Likely absent in the upcoming gun rights ruling will be any invocation of another 14th Amendment clause, prohibiting states from abridging any "priviledges or immunities" of US citizens, which was argued away from application to anything but protection of rights when citizens are "on the high seas" (no joke) by the 1873 Slaughter House rulings, widely thought to be flawed by liberal and conservative Constitutional scholars alike.
Anyway, it looks like Mr. McDonald will get his handgun for self-defense (he does live in the South Side of Chicago, after all). For those chagrined about the ruling, try to remember that the right to keep and bear arms is "right there in the text", as Justice Scalia pointed out. For those worried that the Constitution has been getting trampled on in recent years, it would be a strange state of affairs if this didn't provide some solace, however small.
The Court will likely argue its case using the due process clause of the 14th Amendment, the clause responsible for transporting much of the Bill of Rights to the states (also, famously, the non-enumerated "right to privacy", which played a pivotal rule in the landmark 1973 Roe v. Wade abortion ruling.)
Likely absent in the upcoming gun rights ruling will be any invocation of another 14th Amendment clause, prohibiting states from abridging any "priviledges or immunities" of US citizens, which was argued away from application to anything but protection of rights when citizens are "on the high seas" (no joke) by the 1873 Slaughter House rulings, widely thought to be flawed by liberal and conservative Constitutional scholars alike.
Anyway, it looks like Mr. McDonald will get his handgun for self-defense (he does live in the South Side of Chicago, after all). For those chagrined about the ruling, try to remember that the right to keep and bear arms is "right there in the text", as Justice Scalia pointed out. For those worried that the Constitution has been getting trampled on in recent years, it would be a strange state of affairs if this didn't provide some solace, however small.
Tuesday, March 2, 2010
McDonald vs. Chicago
The Supreme Court today considers whether a ban on handguns in Chicago is Constitutional. McDonald v. Chicago promises to be a significant ruling on the right to bear arms, as the conservative Court will decide whether to extend the Heller decision to states.
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